





Hege, U.; Viala, P.
Publication date:
1997
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Hege, U., & Viala, P. (1997). Contentious Contracts. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1997-109). Finance.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Contentious Contracts¤
Ulrich Hege
Tilburg University and CEPRy
Pascale Viala
Université de Montréal and CIRANOz
September 1997
¤ We would like to thank Georges Dionne, René Garcia, David Margolis, Michel Poitevin,
Jacques Robert, Ilya Segal and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné for many helpful suggestions and sem-
inar audiences at the Université de Montreal and the 1997 Econometric Society North American
Summer Meeting in Pasadena for useful comments. This project was begun while the second
author was visiting INSEE-CREST and …nished while the …rst author was visiting the Université
de Montreal. We are grateful to both institutions and HEC for …nancial support.
y Address: Tilburg University, Department of Finance, PO Box 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg,
Netherlands. E-mail hege@kub.nl.
z Address: Department of Economics, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succ. Centre
Ville, Montreal, H3C 3J7, Canada. E-mail viala@eib.org.
Abstract
This paper o¤ers an explanation of rationally incomplete contracts where
incompleteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship
with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint
resources may be ex ante e¢cient. This happens through costly legal dispute
which arises when contract terms are missing for the undesirable outcomes. We
show that an optimal contract needs only to specify the obligation for the more
litigious party to assure a certain output level - the threshold between foreseen and
unforeseen contingencies - and a linear sharing rule for the foreseen contingencies.
If litigation reveals some information about the e¤ort levels of the agents, less
costly dispute is typically needed and the allocation will improve.
Key words: incomplete contracts, unforeseen contingencies, burning money,
team production, contract law.
JEL classi…cation: D82, K12.
1. Introduction
A puzzling aspect about the simplicity of many contracts is their de…ciency or in-
completeness: terms are missing or contracts are silent about some contingencies.
Furthermore, incompleteness frequently leads to costly legal dispute. For legal
scholars, the phenomenon that legal contest arises because a contingency has not
been addressed in su¢ciently clear terms is the essence of contractual incomplete-
ness. Like other aspects of contract simplicity, this begs for an explanation. Why
are so many contracts open to con‡ict even though litigation-proof contracts are
not hard to write? This question seems pertinent to many types of contracts: to
contracts about commercial transactions like sales, franchises, patent leases and
joint ventures; to labor and executive compensation contracts; …nally, to con-
tracts in private life like marriage contracts and to many other situations where
explicit contracts are used. Take the case of a patent lease as an illustration. At
the outset of their relationship, the lessor and the tenant of a patent lease usually
set up a contract stating a …xed royalty and a (linear) user fee, but remain silent
about many contingencies. As an example for an unforeseen contingency, consider
the following event: the lessor sells a similar, but technically di¤erent device to
a competitor and the tenant unilaterally reduces the fee after the infringement.
It is startling that the parties do not choose to make provisions eliminating any
ensuing con‡ict in this case. It is not hard to come up with su¢ciently general
clauses encompassing all possible contingencies, e.g. a provision that assigns all
such risk to the tenant.
In this article, we propose an explanation of these phenomena stipulating
that there is an implicit agreement between the parties to remain silent about
bad outcomes. Undesirable outcomes are omitted because this raises the potential
for con‡ict, thereby serving as an incentive device against careless behavior or
free-riding.
The observation that unforeseen contingencies are typically undesirable out-
comes is a key element of this mechanism. If such a genuinely undesirable contin-
gency occurs, the question arises whether all parties have done enough to avoid it.
This question provides the backdrop against which con‡ict ensues. The dispute
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is about how to split the bill for the negative consequences. Dispute tends to be
wasteful, as has been shown in theory1; in practice, the single most prominent
form under which dispute destroys resources is through the legal system and its
costs.
The fact that destroying resources or “burning money” can be desirable for
incentives purposes has been recognized in the literature. This is in particular the
case in situations of team production or double moral hazard which is the frame-
work of the present paper. Incidentally, team production has played a prominent
role in incomplete contracts theory since the seminal contribution by Alchian
and Demsetz (1972). Alchian and Demsetz have argued that incentive problems
emanating from joint production are easier to solve within an organization than
via market-based contract solutions. Theoretical work since, however, has shown
that creating a common organization is not su¢cient to solve the team produc-
tion problem. Holmström (1979), Legros and Matsushima (1991) and Williams
and Radner (1988) show that the dilemma remains if the organization has to split
the joint surplus among the agents and their monitors. Therefore, one solution
which Holmström envisions is to discard a fraction of the surplus in some states.
Our model can be viewed as a direct follow-up on Holmström’s suggestion. The
original contribution of the present paper is to link the burning money motive to
contractual incompleteness.
To this end, we propose a general model of team production where parties
address their free-riding problem in contractual form. We show that the optimal
contract is characterized by (a) a linear sharing rule for good outcomes which are
the foreseen contingencies, and (b) a threshold between foreseen and unforeseen
contingencies and omission of the latter. In the patent lease example, an optimal
contract would be a contract which speci…es fee schedules if the contract is used,
but remains silent about the case where the contract is repudiated (the patent is
altered, is infringed or is insu¢ciently exploited). Implicitly, the contract contains
a break point, i.e. rational agents are aware of the fact that the contract will not
always be honored smoothly.
1Theoretical models demonstrating bargaining ine¢ciencies without refering to legal costs
are based on imperfections like bargaining externalities (e.g. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1994)) and
notably, asymmetric information (see the survey by Kennan and Wilson (1993)).
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The role of a court of law in this interpretation is to correct for the de…ciency of
a contract. By rendering a verdict on the con‡ict, the court “…lls in the contract”.
In doing so, the court “veri…es” the state of nature by establishing performance,
compliance, breach or negligence of the disputing parties. In our model, the court
tries to establish the unobservable e¤ort decision of the agents. This comes close
to what courts actually do when they “…ll in” an incomplete contract. To give
some examples, in labor contracts, “in an absence of a waiver of the breach, the
employer may recover damages from his employee ... for involving his employer in
loss through his negligence or wrongful act”2. Similarly, the “respondeat superior”
rule governing the liability of an employer, requires to establish whether or not
the employer was in control of the employee. Cooter and Ulen (1994) stipulate
in their textbook that for e¢ciency reasons, liability should be assigned “to the
party that was the cheaper preventer of, or insurer against, the contingency that
frustrated the contract”.3
In this regard, our model captures an element frequently overlooked in principal-
agent theory: unobservable actions or parameters need not automatically be ex-
cluded from contracting. However, if the agents decide to conditionalize their
contract on an unobservable variable, they implicitly leave it to the court to “…ll
in” the facts about the unobservables. Whether or not the court reveals informa-
tion about the liability of the parties is of secondary importance in our model.
We investigate the extreme case where the court takes random decisions with
respect to establishing e¤ort, in order to emphasize that it is the costliness rather
than the informativeness of the court decisions that constitutes the basis of the
incentive mechanism proposed here. This should not be misunderstood as a claim
that courts of law are ine¤ective when it comes to establishing the facts. On the
contrary, our paper shows that information production of the court is desirable.
This emerges from an extension to informative litigation. We show that the more
accurate the information that litigation reveals, the better for the contracting
parties because the discovery in court will be anticipated in the optimal contract
and enhance the incentive e¤ect of litigation.
An obvious question is why the constrained e¢cient arrangement should be
256 CJS 500.
3Cooter and Ulen (1988), p. 281.
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burning money in a legal dispute rather than, say, transferring them to a third
party. We suggest the following reason: the use of contentious contracts renders
the disposal of resources irrevocable, whereas allocating revenues to a third party
is vulnerable to coalition formation or renegotiation.
Besides the explicit contracts mentioned earlier, joint production or double
moral hazard is present in economic partnerships like law …rms and account-
ing …rms, in relationships with two-sided speci…c investments like upstream-
downstream relationships4, in employment contracts and in …nancial contracts5.
In all these cases, the following conditions seem to hold: (a) elements of two-sided
moral hazard are present; (b) there is a positive probability of the relationship
breaking up or costly con‡ict ensuing; (c) the threshold where such con‡ict is
expected to occur depends on the contract; (d) the consequences in this case are
not clearly speci…ed. These four properties are the basic ingredients of our model.
Whenever they occur jointly, then the implementation device analyzed out here
should be present in practice, consciously or unconsciously.
The comparison of our explanation of unforeseen contingencies to various
strands of the contracting literature reveals similarities and di¤erences. Incom-
plete contracts are often de…ned as contracts that do not conditionalize on “ob-
servable, but not veri…able” states of nature. The accepted explanation for this
type of contractual incompleteness is based on prohibitive transaction costs to
writing complete contracts or, which is equivalent, on bounded rationality.6 A
number of papers have formally endogenized the choice of incomplete contracts as
a rational response to transactions cost problems, notably by invoking complexity
costs.7
In our model, contingencies are both observable and veri…able. Veri…cation
costs are avoidable, but they occur as an artefact of the optimal contract. The
4For example, Hart and Moore (1988). The ensuing literature is surveyed in Hart (1995).
5For example, securities issues involve various parties (issuer, underwriter, rating agency).
Joint stockholdings of a family-dominated company is another example.
6Three di¤erent forms of transactions costs are generally invoked: …rst, complexity costs in
discerning large sets and intricately de…ned states of nature; second, legal veri…cation costs in
…guring out what the actual state is; third, costs of forecasting all possible contingencies. See
Grossman and Hart (1986) for the seminal contribution and Hart (1995) and Tirole (1994) for
surveys.
7Notably, Anderlini and Felli (1994)(1996) and MacLeod (1996).
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conventional view on incomplete contracts is one of bounded rationality (parties
know that a complete contract would serve them better). The papers explaining
incompleteness by means of complexity costs o¤er a boundedly rational explana-
tion of incomplete contracts. In our explanation, contractual incompleteness is
unboundedly rational : parties can deal with any complexity of the situation, but
they know that a complete contract (which they could draw up at no cost) would
be worse.8 Thus, the recent criticism of incomplete contracts models based on
unveri…ability9 does not extend to our model.10
There are some similarities with the costly state veri…cation (CSV) and au-
diting literature.11 In this work as well as in our model, veri…cation costs are
avoidable, but they occur for incentive reasons and only for bad outcomes. How-
ever, in the CSV literature, contracts are complete and there are adverse selection
problems about the outcome. In our model, contracts are incomplete and there
is no lack of observability of the outcome. The relationship to the literature on
the breach of contracts and breach remedies is similarly complex.12 On the one
hand, breach of contract is frequently a special case of the legal con‡icts that
our model addresses.13 On the other hand, not every breach of contract leads to
con‡ict, particularly not if the contract is su¢ciently complete about the breach
remedies.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section 2. Section
3 introduces to the role of dispute as an implementation device. In Section 4, the
optimal contracts are developed. In Section 5, we introduce informative litigation.
In Section 6, we discuss the robustness of our mechanism. Section 7 concludes.
8Segal (1995) is another paper where incompleteness is unboundedly rational.
9The criticism is whether unveri…ability, if modelled in a rational choice model, is a su¢cient
condition to explain incompleteness. See e.g. Tirole (1994).
10A similar di¤erence arises with respect to the dynamic properties of incomplete contracts:
within the transaction costs view, contracts which are initially incomplete may be dynamically
completed in a time consistent manner as events evolve and therefore not lead to a di¤erent
allocation than a complete contract. A formalization of this idea is in Maskin and Tirole (1997).
See also Hart (1987), p. 753.. In our model, there is no time consistent completion of incomplete
contracts.
11Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985).
12See Shavell (1984), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and Che and Chung (1996).
13Breach of contract is typically one-sided, the break-up of relationships often two-sided and
con‡ict may not lead to a break-up at all.
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2. The model
The model depicts two agents 1 and 2 concluding a contract about a joint pro-
duction e¤ort. There are two dates. At date 0, they sign the contract. The joint
output is determined by the agents’ e¤orts between date 0 and date 1. At date
1, the joint output is realized and distributed according to their agreement.
Let ai denote the level of e¤ort of agent i; i 2 f1; 2g, which is chosen from
the convex set Ai . The cost of e¤ort is expressed by the cost function c(ai)
which is increasing and strictly convex. The function c(ai) is the same for both
agents. The two agents are risk-neutral and utility is transferable. x 2 X = [0; ¹x]
will denote a generic level of output. The joint output function is stochastic
and characterized by the cumulative distribution function F (¢ja1; a2) and density
f(¢ja1; a2), with f(xja1; a2) > 0 over X for all (a1; a2) 2 A1 £ A2. Fi(xja1; a2) =
@F (xja1; a2)=@ai and fi(xja1; a2) = @f(xja1; a2)=@ai denote the partials. Let
E[xja1; a2] =
R
X x f(xja1; a2)dx denote the expected output. We assume that






2) 2 arg max
(a1;a2)
E[xja1; a2] ¡ c(a1) ¡ c(a2):
Moreover, we assume:
Assumption 1. The joint output distribution function satis…es
f1(xja1; a2) = k(a1; a2) f2(xja1; a2)
for all x 2 X and (a1; a2) 2 A1 £ A2, where k(a1; a2) is a single-valued and
positive function.
This assumption says that the likelihood ratios of any e¤ort pro…le (a1; a2)
are collinear.14 Then, there is no way to infer the contribution of each agent in
terms of e¤ort from a particular level of output. This has been identi…ed as the
14This assumption comprises many standard production function with conventional speci…ca-
tions of stochastic shocks, including the class of functions of the form x = Q[g(a1; a2); "], where
" is an additive or a multiplicative productivity shock.
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key condition for a team problem to prevail.15
Assumption 2. E¤ort ameliorates the distribution function in the sense of







> 0; 8x 2 X; (a1; a2) 2 A1 £ A2:
MLRP is a standard assumption in principal-agents models, which is typically
made to demonstrate the monotonicity of incentives contracts. It implies …rst-
order stochastic dominance of the output with respect to e¤ort.
The joint output of production is veri…able, but e¤ort is only privately ob-
servable by each of the agents. Contracts may be contingent on the output alone
or contain performance requirements. In the …rst case, contracts are enforceable
at no cost. In the second case, agents must rely on a mechanism which enforces
the revelation of the unobservable information. The only option16 is to legally
enforce provisions about the unobservable e¤ort level. If there is legal action, the
role of the court is to sort out whether there has been fault of the parties. The
court has to render a verdict, but is e¤ectively impeded from establishing the
facts as the actions are unobservable. We capture this by the assumption that
the verdict of a court is stochastically independent from the agents’ true choices
of e¤ort, i.e. agents have no impact on their chances to prevail in court if they
increase or reduce their e¤ort levels. This extreme case implies that the speci…ed
“required” e¤ort level plays no role for the allocation because the true e¤ort level
remains as unobservable in court as out-of-court.17
With the required e¤ort level being irrelevant, the contractual choice con-
cerning legal enforcement is about the states where contest is possible, e.g. states
where a performance requirement applies. For example, contest can be excluded
15Whenever Assumption 1 holds, then a balanced sharing rule leading to (ae1; a
e
2) does not
exist. See Williams and Radner (1988). A similar condition for the discrete case is contained in
Legros and Matsushima (1991).
16A self-enforcing contract giving incentives for voluntary revelation of private information is
not possible if Assumption 1 holds.
17This provides an additional insight on contractual incompleteness, because the parties will
do as well by remaining silent about required performance and to leave it to the court to “…ll
in” this requirement according to the law.
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by a water-tight provision for a certain outcome, like a waiver of one of the two
parties to ever claim damages under a certain outcome. Contest can also be ex-
cluded by a clause stating that a certain output level x is regarded as su¢cient
proof that both parties met their performance requirements. On the other hand,
contest can be included if the contract is insu¢ciently speci…c about a certain
state or is not tight enough to exclude litigation. Let S1 ½ X denote the set of
states where agent 1 can invoke a contestable performance requirement binding
agent 2 and bring an action against agent 2 for the payment of damages, and vice
versa for x 2 S2:18 If x 2 S1 \ S2; then both agents could bring an action. We
assume that in this case, only one law suit is accepted in court, depending on a
chance move by nature: either law suit is accepted with probability 12 .
Let S = S1 [S2 denote the set of all states where at least one agent can bring
an action. We say that if x 2 S, then x is a contestable state. A contract where
S = ; is called a complete or litigation-proof contract. Whenever S non-empty,
the contract is called a contentious contract.
For any outcome state x 2 Si, the contract may specify the damages Di(x)
that the plainti¤ (agent i) recovers from the defendant (agent j) if the court rules
that performance was insu¢cient. We assume that there are legal or institutional
bounds to applicable damages which we denote by Dmax(x): For example, under
United States commercial law, punitive damages in contract disputes (damages
exceeding the monetary loss of the victim) are routinely denied in court even if
the contract expressly contains provisions for higher damages. We simply assume
that an e¤ective bound on damages exists somewhere, with @Dmax(x)=@x · 0.
Among the many prior models on pre-trial settlement and litigation, we choose
to adapt Schweizer’s (1989) because it is the simplest model with two-sided asym-
metric information.19 Only the essential features are summarized here, leaving a
complete account of this model to Appendix A. In any contestable state x 2 S,
both parties have private information regarding the merit of the case: each agent
18Note that, even if the contract is silent about the required performance, there will usually
be a commercial law imposing performance standards, either statutory law like the Uniform
Commercial Code or judicial precedents. This permits to contest each others e¤ort whenever
the contract does not exclude so, for example via waiver clauses.
19Two-sided asymmetric information is desirable because we want to endogenize the choice of
defendant and plainti¤ as a function of their litigiousness.
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observes a signal which has two possible outcomes, “strong” or “weak”. The sig-
nals are obtained at the same time when agents choose their actions. They are
independently distributed. Whether the case is won or not depends on the pair of
signals. After having received their signals, parties have the opportunity to settle
their dispute.20 There is no cost to settlement bargaining. The defendant makes
a settlement o¤er and the plainti¤ decides whether to accept or to reject the o¤er.
If she rejects, the case is going to court, at a cost which is a deadweight loss. We
assume that this cost is linear in Di(x) and denote it by l ¢Di(x). l ¢Di(x) is split
according to the English Rule, i.e. the loser pays all.
Of the equilibria of this game, we consider only one, the least-cost fully re-
vealing equilibrium.21 The logic of this separating equilibrium is that the plainti¤
uses the probability to reject an o¤er as a screening device inducing the two types
of the defendant to make truthful settlement o¤ers. In this equilibrium, only the
o¤er of a “strong” defendant is sometimes rejected while the o¤er of a “weak”
defendant is always accepted. Let p(1) ( p(2) ) denote the probability that agent
1 (agent 2) receives the “strong” signal. The higher p(1) or p(2), the more likely
is pretrial settlement bound to fail. Therefore, we refer to p(1) and p(2) as mea-
suring how litigious the agents are. Let p(i) ( p(j) ) denote the litigiousness of
the agent who is designated as plainti¤ (defendant). Let q(i) denote the (endoge-
nous) probability of acceptance by plainti¤ i of a settlement o¤er proposed by
the “good” defendant j. The expected payo¤s of plainti¤ and defendant for a
case brought by agent i in state x 2 Si will be denoted as ¦p(x; i) and ¦d(x; i),
respectively, where ¦p(x; i) ¸ 0 ¸ ¦d(x; i). C(x; i) will denote the expected net
cost of litigation in this case. Then:
C(x; i) = ¡
³
¦p(x; i) + ¦d(x; i)
´
= p(j)(1 ¡ q(i)) l Di(x) ¸ 0: (2.1)
20We exclude renegotiation prior to reception of the signals. The idea is that the signals
are a reduced form which really tries to capture pretrial discovery e¤orts. If agents can and
will acquire information prior to litigation, they can and will do so also prior to settlement
bargaining. It can be shown that asymmetric information obtains as an endogenous outcome of
costly discovery, but this would come at the expense of a considerably more complicated model
structure.
21This is the equilibrium where the o¤er of the defendant is fully revealing (concerning his
type) and where the probability of the plainti¤ accepting the o¤er is maximized (Riley outcome).
This is also the single outcome surviving all standard re…nements developed for signaling games
(universal divinity or stable outcome).
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In the expression of C(x; i), all transfers between the agents cancel out and
only the deadweight cost remains. This cost is equal to l ¢ Di(x) times the prob-
ability that the settlement o¤er is rejected which is p(j)(1 ¡ q(i)). A useful
observation is that C(x; i) is (linearly) increasing inDi(x). In Appendix A, we
show that C(x; i) is more sensitive to the litigiousness of the defendant than to the
litigiousness of the plainti¤. The intuition is simple: the plainti¤ adopts a mixed
strategy making the “weak” defendant indi¤erent between a truthful o¤er and
mimicking a strong type. The more likely it is that the defendant is strong, the
more often must a strong o¤er be rejected to keep the weak defendant’s incentives










We summarize the instruments available for contracting. Recall that parties
can choose the set of contestable states S as well as a sharing rule and a function
of damages for contestable states. Thus, any feasible contract can be represented
as f¯(x); D1(x);D2(x); S1; S2g, where ¯(x) is a sharing rule of the joint output,
Di(x) is the (contingent) amount of damages that can be demanded by agent i in
state x 2 Si, and Si is the set of contestable states x where agent i is designated
as plainti¤.
3. Dispute as an implementation device
Let R1(x) denote agent 1’s and R2(x) denote agent 2’s ex-ante expected litigation
payo¤ in state x: That is, R1(x) = ¦p(x; 1) and R2(x) = ¦d(x; 1) if x 2 S1nS2
(agent 1 is plainti¤) and R1(x) = ¦d(x; 2) and R2(x) = ¦p(x; 2) if x 2 S2nS1
(agent 2 is plainti¤). Moreover, R1(x) = 12
³






¦d(x; 1) + ¦p(x; 2)
´
if x 2 S1 \ S2. Of course, R1(x) = R2(x) = 0 for x 2
XnS since contest is excluded for these states. We denote agent 1’s and agent
2’s (date 0) expected utility by V 1(K; (a1; a2)) and V 2(K; (a1; a2)) respectively,
where K = f¯(x);D1(x);D2(x); S1; S2g is the contract. Taking into account
budget balancing, we have:
V 1(K; (a1; a2)) =
Z
X




V 2(K; (a1; a2)) =
Z
X





Incentive compatibility of an action pro…le (a1; a2) requires that
ai 2 arg max
âi
V i(K; (â1; a2)); for i = 1; 2:
It is convenient to apply the …rst-order approach (FOA) to our analysis. The
FOA approach allows us to replace the set of incentive compatibility constraints
by a pair of …rst-order conditions.22 Technically speaking, this approach requires
additional assumptions ensuring that the expected utility function V i(K; (a1; a2))
is strictly concave in agent i’s action23. The following …rst order conditions are
then necessary and su¢cient for interior solution to the agents’ e¤ort problems:
Z
X
¯(x) f1(xja1; a2)dx ¡ c1(a1) +
Z
X
R1(x)f1(xja1; a2)dx = 0 (3.1)
Z
X
(1 ¡ ¯(x)) f2(xja1; a2)dx ¡ c2(a2) +
Z
X
R2(x)f2(xja1; a2)dx = 0 (3.2)
It is useful to begin with a complete contract as a benchmark. Let (ac1; a
c
2)
denote the action pro…le which is attainable under a complete contract. Recall
that for a complete contract, S = ; and hence, RX Ri(x)fi(xja1; a2)dx = 0; i =
1; 2: The …rst order equations (3.1) and (3.2) show then that (ac1; a
c
2) is determined
as the solution to the …rst-order conditions
R
X ¯(x) f1(xjac1; ac2)dx ¡ c1(ac1) = 0
and
R
X(1 ¡ ¯(x)) f2(xjac1; ac2)dx ¡ c2(ac2) = 0. The ine¢ciency of this allocation
can be seen from the fact that the optimal allocation (ae1; a
e
2) is determined by
the …rst-order conditions
R
xfi(xjae1; ae2)dx ¡ ci(aei ) = 0; i = 1; 2. Whatever
the splitting rule ¯(x); these conditions are incompatible. This is the well-known
result of the team production literature that a balanced sharing rule does not allow
to accomplish this task for both agents simultaneously if Assumption 1 holds24.
The attainable action pro…le (ac1; a
c
2) is inferior to the …rst best allocation.
22Regarding this approach, consult Mirrlees (1979), Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt (1988) for one-
dimensional principal agent models and Sinclair-Desgagné (1994) for multi-dimensional principal
agent problems. Su¢cient conditions for the validity of this approach for the partnership problem
are also provided by Williams and Radner (1988).
23 If p(1) = p(2), a su¢cient condition for the FOA to be valid here is the Mirrlees (1979)
- Rogerson (1985) convexity of the distribution function condition (CDFC), which says that
Fi(xja1; a2) is strictly increasing with ai: If p(1) 6= p(2), then an additional boundary condition







; where ¾ ¸ ¡@Dmax(x)=@x; a < ae is the highest implementable level of
e¤ort and k is the minimum value of function k(a1;a2) over [0; a]£ [0; a] :
24Using Assumption 1 and adding up the FOC, one can see that the attainable allocation
solves
R
xf1(xjac1; ac2)dx¡ c1(ac1) = kc2(ac2) and
R
xf2(xjac1; ac2)dx¡ c2(ac2) = c1(ac1)=k.
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What is the role of legal dispute? Suppose that the parties want to implement
an action pro…le (a1; a2) > (ac1; a
c
2): A contentious contract can achieve this by









It turns out that only the net costs of litigation are relevant for implementa-
tion. The reason for this is simple: since there is no way to determine the agents’
relative e¤ort levels from the observation of the joint output, all that matters
for incentives purposes is the sum of the punishment that can be in‡icted to the
parties and hence damages transfers between the agents cancel out. Let C(x)





0 for x 2 XnS
C(x; 1) for x 2 S1nS2
C(x; 2) for x 2 S2nS1
(12C(x; 1) +
1
2C(x; 2)) for x 2 S1 \ S2:
The additional punishment can be positive by an appropriate choice of the
set S. In short, litigation plays the role of a “budget breaker” allowing to impose
penalties for both agents simultaneously.
4. Optimal contracts
In this section, we characterize the optimal contracts. The relaxed optimization
problem can be written as:
max
¯(x); D1(x); D2(x);S1;S2











1 ¡ ¯(x) + R2(x)¢ f2(xja1; a2)dx ¡ c2(a2) ¸ 0 (4.3)
Di(x) 2 [0;Dmax(x)] ; i = 1; 2; 8x (4.4)
Si ½ X; i = 1; 2; (4.5)
where constraints (4.2) and (4.3) are the incentive compatibility constraints
for the two agents and constraint (4.4) recalls the existence of legal limits on dam-
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ages. Moreover, individual rationality constraints of the form V 1(K; (a1; a2)) ¸ 0
and V 2(K; (a1; a2)) ¸ 0 must hold. These can w.l.o.g. be assumed to be satis-
…ed because there are no limited liability constraints.25 Note that the objective
function (4.1) is equal to the net surplus:
V 1(K; (a1; a2)) + V








We denote by x̂(a1; a2) the (unique) output level such that f1(xja1; a2) · 0 for
all x · x̂ and f1(xja1; a2) > 0 otherwise26. The basic properties of the solution
are contained in Lemma 1:
Lemma 1. The following contract K¤ = f¯¤(x);D¤1(x);D¤2(x); S¤1 ; S¤2g is optimal
and leads to an action pro…le (a¤1; a
¤










1. The sharing rule is linear: ¯¤(x) = ¯¤x + B¤; 8x, where B¤; ¯¤ 2 <:
2. Dispute occurs for all states below some threshold of dispute x¤ : S¤ =
fx 2 X : x < x¤g, where x¤ is such that 0 · x¤ < x̂(a¤1; a¤2).
3. A performance requirement applies only to the more litigious agent: S¤1 = ;
if p(1) > p(2); or S¤2 = ; if p(2) > p(1). If p(1) = p(2), then either of the
agents or both can be assigned the performance requirement.
4. In each contestable state x 2 S¤, damages are at the maximum feasible
level: D¤i (x) = D
max(x).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The characteristics of this contract are closely linked to the collinearity of the
likelihood ratios. This implies that there is no way to determine ex post which
agent has been more responsible for an observed output. On the one hand, this
is the reason why a linear sharing rule can do as well as any other (non-linear)
25 Individual rationality can always be satis…ed by adding or subtracting a constant to ¯(x):
The value of this constant will depend on the bargaining power of the agents.
26 If MLRP holds, then there exists, for each action pro…le (a1; a2), a unique output level
x̂(a1; a2); x < x̂(a1; a2) < x, such that fi(xja1; a2) · 0 8x · x̂(a1; a2).
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balanced splitting rule.27 On the other hand, the impossibility to tell who has
been the likely deviator is also the reason why an optimal incentive scheme relies
on extra punishment via a costly dispute. The most e¤ective impact on incentives
is brought about by invoking the dispute option for those states whose probability
of occurrence is most drastically increasing if one of the agents provides too
little e¤ort. Under MLRP, this is true for the outcomes in the lower tail of the
distribution. This explains why the contestable states should be chosen to be the
worst outcomes of the joint production e¤ort.
An important feature of the optimal contract K¤ is that the con‡ict thresh-
old x¤ is inferior to the value x̂, the point where the maximal increase in the
cumulative distribution induced by an agent’s deviation occurs: Intuitively, if the
dispute threshold were any higher than x̂; the incentive e¤ect would be lower
and the deadweight cost higher than at x̂; which cannot be optimal. This result
con…rms our interpretation of contestable states as undesirable outcomes, where
undesirable has two meanings: these outcomes represent the worst outcomes of
the joint production function and the probability of these outcomes increases if
an agent deviates. This corresponds to how legal scholars think about unforeseen
contingencies: they are described as outcomes which the parties should have tried
to avoid. Hence, in contract law, the response to an unforeseen contingency is to
search for the agent who caused the unwanted outcome or who would have been
best placed to avoid it. Our analysis vindicates this view.
The improvement in the e¤ort allocation depends on how much of the joint
product can be destroyed in each contestable state, i.e. the net cost of litiga-
tion. This net cost should be maximized in order to keep the threshold x¤ as
low as possible. This explains the last two items of Lemma 1. On the one
hand, the probability of a costly litigation increases with the contractual dam-
ages. Hence, maximal net costs of litigation are achieved by imposing maximal
penalties, Di(x) = Dmax(x): On the other hand, the probability of a litigation in-
creases with the chances to face a litigious defendant, i.e. a defendant more likely
to receive a “strong” signal. This explains why the assignment of the performance
27 Intuitively, any attempt to raise the slope of the incentive schedule for one agent with a
non-linear contract comes at the cost of symmetrically weakening incentives for the other agent.
See Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) for a demonstration for an output function which is
a special case of ours.
14
requirement is asymmetric: di¤erences in the attitude of agents towards litigation
are optimally exploited. If such di¤erences do not exist, i.e. if p(i) = p(j), then
the choice of the defendant is indeterminate.28 It is always su¢cient to make
just a single agent liable, even though both parties are perfectly aware of the
two-sidedness of the moral hazard problem. Thus, one insight of our model is
that one-sided performance requirements do not mean that in reality, the moral
hazard problem is one-sided. It simply means that the contract is optimized by
exploiting perceived di¤erences.
We now turn to our main result which simpli…es the provisions for contestable
states:
Proposition 1. Let D̂i(x) be the damages awarded if the plainti¤ wins: Sup-
pose that D̂i(x) = minfDi(x); Dmax(x)g if Di(x) is speci…ed in the contract and
D̂(x) = Dmax(x) if not. Then, the optimal contract K¤ is equivalent to a contract
containing only the following provisions:
1. If p(1) 6= p(2), the more litigious of the agents commits to deliver an output
of x¤ or more. If p(1) = p(2), either of the agents or both commit to deliver
an output of x¤ or more.
2. A linear sharing rule for all x ¸ x¤:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The additional element of Proposition 1 over Lemma 1 is that, when max-
imal damages are una¤ected by the terms of a contract, the optimal contract
can remain silent about contestable states altogether and contestable states can
be viewed as truly unforeseen contingencies. In practice, many contracts ex-
hibit features like this: they impose a performance level for the agents and take
satisfactory performance for granted by not specifying what happens if the defen-
dant does not deliver. An optimal contract corresponding to Proposition 1 can
obviously be written in a very simple form, for example like this:
28The plainti¤ who is liberated from a performance requirement receives in turn incentives by
receiving a higher share of the joint surplus. There must be a compensation for this di¤erential
treatment: usually, the designated plainti¤ will make a lump-sum payment B to the designated
defendant:
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“Agent 2 has to deliver an output of x¤ (or better). After ful…llment, agent 1
makes a lump-sum payment of B¤ and retains a share of ¯¤ of the output x.”
No mention is made what happens if x < x¤. The rationale for this omission
is that …lling in by the court will be just as good as explicit penalties. This result
is based on the following two insights.
First, this conclusion depends of course on the assumption that the dam-
ages will be Dmax(x) if the contract is silent about contentious states. A ratio-
nal plainti¤ will always seek the maximum damages. This leads us to conclude
that nothing is to be gained by explicitly providing applicable penalties. For, if
Di(x) < D
max(x), then the contract is not optimal. If Di(x) = Dmax(x), then
the penalty need not be mentioned in the contract. It follows that the optimal
contract can be silent about the function Di(x):
We illustrate the plausibility of the condition in Proposition 1 by means of
two examples. In commercial contracts, punitive damages are routinely denied in
court, even if a contract expressly grants higher damages, setting the maximum
amount which can be obtained at the full restitution of the defendant’s loss.
In terms of our model, this would amount to Dmax(x) = x¤ ¡ x. But then,
the plainti¤ can and will seek full restitution even if …nes are not mentioned in
the contract. Divorce law is the other example. There is an obvious limit on
the compensation that spouses can demand, namely …fty percent of their joint
wealth. Marriage contracts (like separation of goods) can only limit this amount
and thus reduce the potential for con‡ict, but not increase it.
Second, we consider what the contract should determine concerning the split-
ting rule ¯(x) in case of a bad outcome x < x¤: When rendering a verdict, the
court …xes also a splitting rule ¯(x): either by con…rming the rule in place, or by
modifying it, or by …lling in a splitting rule in case the contract does not mention
one. Recall that we de…ned the damages to be the di¤erence in the plainti¤’s
total revenue if she wins the trial as compared to the case where she loses it.
This di¤erence will be …xed at Dmax(x). It is straightforward to show that the
ine¢ciency in the settlement bargaining game depends only on the di¤erence in
the plainti¤’s payo¤ between a won and a lost case. The penalty depends on
what is at stake for the parties in the dispute which is the di¤erence between the
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payo¤s in both cases, not their absolute level.29
To complete our analysis, it is of interest to know when litigation would ac-
tually be part of an optimal contract, i.e. when x¤ > 0. In fact, this is the case
whenever the joint output distribution function is such that the likelihood ratio
f1(0jac1;ac2)
f (0jac1;ac2)
is small. More precisely, we …nd:
Corollary 1. The optimal contract will be contentious if
R
x x f1(xjac1; ac2)dx ¡ c1(a1)R
x xf11(xjac1; ac2)dx ¡ c11(a1)
f1(0jac1; ac2)
f(0jac1; ac2)
> 1 : (4.6)
Proof. See the Appendix.
In other words, if condition (4.6) holds, then there exists a non-empty set
S ½ [0; x̂(ac1; ac2)] for which the marginal return of an increase in e¤ort with
respect to saved litigation costs outweigh its marginal cost.
5. Informative litigation
In the model discussed so far, we have assumed that the prospect of agents to
prevail in court is independent of their e¤ort. This abstraction was made for
simplicity. Often, the court can reconstruct at least some indications about the
e¤ort. In short, the e¤ort choice should in‡uence the probability with which the
agents expect to prevail in court.
Recall that agents’ chances to prevail on court depend on private signals. In
the basic model, the signals were uncorrelated with the true performance levels
(see Appendix 9.9). By contrast, in this section, we capture the idea that the court
is partially successful in retrieving information by assuming that the probabilities
of the signals “strong” and “weak” depend on the agents’ unobservable actions.
Hence, the merit of the case is expected to be weaker for an agent who has
deviated. The signal probabilities are then functions of the e¤ort choices. We
denote by pI(ai) for agent i (the designated plainti¤) and by pI(aj) for agent
29There might be an additional reason to remain silent about damages, which is that it creates
uncertainty about what the parties perceive would be likely or realistic claims for damages. Thus,
a second element of asymmetric information about the amount of damages may come into the
play which, in a separating equilibrium, could increase the probability of a failure of pre-trial
settlement bargaining.
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j (the designated defendant) the probability to observe the strong signal if she
takes action ai and aj , respectively. We say that litigation is informative if the
signal pI(ai) is such that:
d pI(ai)
d ai
> 0 8 ai; i 2 f1; 2g
If litigation is informative, the conditions for incentive compatibility of a cer-
tain e¤ort level change.30 In fact, an agent who deviates to a worse action ai < a¤i
can expect to receive a worse signal that is indicative for the likely cost to be borne
by her. A deviation in‡icts an expected punishment upon the deviator. There-
fore, one may suspect that an increase in the correlation of the signals with actions
will make the use of contentious contracts a more e¢cient instrument. We restrict
attention to symmetric models, i.e. f(xja; a0) = f (xja0; a) 8 (a; a0) 2 A1£A2 and
pI(a1) = p
I(a2) if a1 = a2. For our comparison in Proposition 2, we relate the
signal probabilities pI(ai) ( pI(aj) ) to corresponding probabilities in a model
which is identical except that signals are uninformative. For the latter, we keep
the notation p(i) ( p(j) ). We use the following notation: (aI ; aI) denote the
optimal allocation in the informative case, (a¤; a¤) in the uninformative case, and
SI and S¤ denote the corresponding optimal sets of dispute states.
Proposition 2. Suppose that pI(a¤) = p(i) = p(j). Then, the following results
hold for the comparison of the symmetric allocations (aI ; aI) and (a¤; a¤) :
1. The set of dispute states SI needed to implement (a¤; a¤) is smaller, SI <
S¤.
2. The allocation is pareto-superior in the informative case.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In short, having informative litigation is unambiguously good news if the
quali…cation in the Proposition hold. Note that, under these conditions, both
agents are equally litigious at the optimal solutions. Then, informed litigation
decreases the necessary scope of dispute states and makes implementation less
costly. As a consequence, higher e¤ort levels will be implemented.
30See Appendix.
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The intuition for the impact of information in litigation can also be explained
by the analogy to monitoring. An informed court retrieves information about
the e¤ort levels, which were hitherto unobservable. Because the verdict is condi-
tional on this information, the outcome compares to a situation where a monitor
(as in Alchian and Demsetz’ proposal) obtains information on the e¤ort levels
and rewards or punishes the agents accordingly. Obviously, this can improve the
situation even if monitoring is not very accurate, as long as the monitor obtains
some information in a statistical sense. The accuracy of jurisdiction is re‡ected
in the present model by the functions pI(aj) and pI(ai)31. Suppose for a mo-
ment that the court is a perfectly informed monitor. Relaxing the independency





1 if a2 < aI
0 if a2 ¸ aI if agent 1’s e¤ort is less than aI
1
2 if a2 ¸ aI if agent 1’s e¤ort is aI or higher
and correspondingly concerning agent 2.
In other words, the adjudication, as measured by these functions would be
discontinuous around the targeted e¤ort levels, for example the e¢cient levels aI .
It is not hard to see that this adjudication can implement the e¢cient allocation,
provided that damages Dmax(x) are large enough. This is of course only possible
if the court were a perfect monitor which is quite unrealistic. But the same
logic carries over: the better the court is informed, the steeper the expected
punishments and rewards that can be in‡icted upon agents as a statistical function
of their true e¤ort levels. It can be shown that the e¢ciency gain of the allocation
depends monotonically on feasible damages Dmax(x).
Another comparative statics question is how the e¢ciency gain depends on
the quality of information, i.e. on the slope of the functions pI(a1) and pI(a2)?
This amounts to the comparative statics analysis of the impact of an increase in
the of pI(a1) and pI(a2). We add an informal discussion of this question. It turns
out that an increase in the slope of d p
I (ai)
d ai
is not su¢cient to get a monotonicity
result. Similar to the condition stated in Proposition 2, an additional assump-
31To be precise, it is actually also measured by ®dp which is, for simplicity, kept con-
stant throughout the paper. Extending informativeness to ®dp would not change the results
qualitatively.
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tion concerning the absolute values of signal probabilities around a¤ is needed.
With this quali…cation, the comparative statics is actually monotonic. That is,
the higher the slope of the functions pI(aj) and pI(ai) etc., the smaller the
necessary set of contestable states, the higher the implementable e¤ort allocation
and welfare.32
6. The robustness of litigation
Dispute is an inherently wasteful implementation device. The reader is probably
wondering if there is not a less expensive way to achieve the same goal, for
example by transferring the resources to a third party. In this section, we propose
an explanation why wasteful legal dispute may be preferred. We argue that
any attempt to transfer these outlays may not be robust against renegotiation
or collusion. By contrast, the burning money mechanism created by contract
incompleteness appears to be well suited to withstand strategic opportunism. We
discuss renegotiation, coalition formation and …nally corruption of the judiciary.
6.1. Renegotiation-proofness
Imagine that agents envision the following solution. Instead of wasting surplus in
a costly dispute, they write a complete contract including the following provision:
an amount Dmax(x) is paid to a third person like a charitable fund whenever the
joint output x is less than the threshold x¤: Hence, if the expected donation is
equivalent to the wasted resources through litigation in the contentious contract,
then incentives should be the same. The important drawback, however, is that
the contractual promise would not be renegotiation-proof. Once a bad outcome
x < x¤ is realized, parties would quickly agree to renege on the promised donation.
Because the contribution is a gift, the bene…ciary has no legal title to sue.
To show this formally, one simply supposes that renegotiation is possible after
the actions (a1; a2) are sunk and agents observe their signals. An equilibrium is
renegotiation-proof if the initial contract remains in place after the renegotiation
stage, for all states x: However, for all states x < x¤, whoever is making the last
o¤er will …nd it bene…cial to propose a split of Dmax(x) rather than letting the
32A formal condition behind this comparative statics analysis, called co-monotonicity, can be
added and corresponding results are straightforward extensions of the proof of the Proposition.
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initial contract in place. Since the state is perfectly observable, the other party
will always accept.
By contrast, the separating equilibrium of the pre-trial settlement game with-
stands renegotiation, because the contract incompleteness forces renegotiation to
take place in a situation of asymmetric information. To see this, simply note
that the pre-trial settlement game is in itself a renegotiation stage. Because of
asymmetric information about the merit of a court case, ex post ine¢ciency is
unavoidable in a separating equilibrium.
6.2. Coalition-proofness
The renegotiation problem could be avoided by signing an explicit contract with
the third party. For example, the agents might …nd a third party agreeing to pay
them an amount of
R x¤ C(x)f(xja¤1; a¤2)dx up front, in exchange of the transfer of
C(x) in each state x < x¤. Not only is the
R x¤ C(x)f(xja¤1; a¤2)dx not wasted, it is
also redistributed to the agents. Hence, they should prefer this to a contentious
contract. The problem with this solution is that it is not coalitions-proof. Any
of the two agents, say agent i, could approach the third party with the following
proposal:
“Agent i chooses a lower e¤ort level than a¤i ; the probability of a bad outcome
increases marginally, which will bene…t the third party by
R x¤ C(x)fi(xja¤i ; a¤j )dx. Both agree on a split of this additional transfer such that
agent i is enticed to lower her e¤ort below a¤i and both parties are better o¤.”
In other words, agent i and the third party can pro…tably collude at the
expense of agent j.
To show this more rigorously, we invoke the concept of Coalition-Proof Nash
Equilibrium (CPNE) (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987)). Loosely speaking,
a Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof if no coalition of players would …nd it ben-
e…cial to undertake a joint deviation or if any such pro…tably deviating coalition
would itself be undermined by a pro…tably deviating sub-coalition. The set of
CPNE is a subset of the Nash equilibria of a game.
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To apply this concept, we extend the game in the following way. We assume
that the agents have the option to transfer resources either to “players” or to
“sinks” which are assumed not to be players of the game33. Concerning the
di¤erence between both transfer options, we assume that ex ante contracts (of
the sort that can contain a payment in exchange for the contingent transfer)
can only be written with “players” and coalitions can only be formed with these
agents. Note that coalitions will only be accepted if they are formed prior to
taking actions ai and aj. After actions are sunk, the reason to form coalitions has
gone. It is then possible to demonstrate that any equilibrium of the game where




Thus, agents face the following dilemma: if they transfer to players in order
not to waste resources, then the contract is prone to be undermined by collusion.
If they transfer to sinks, then the resources are lost for the agents. Furthermore,
in the latter case, the two agents are not better o¤ than if they squander resources
through costly legal dispute34, even though there might be recipients bene…ting
from the transfer which is not necessarily the case for legal disputes. We conclude:
there might be solutions which are socially preferable to the dispute solution
(as someone bene…ts from the transferred resources), but they are not privately
preferable for the agents. The court system may not be the socially optimal
device to squander resources, but the agents have little incentive to look for other
solutions.
33An example of sinks is the device the paper has focused on hitherto, legal fees and other
direct court costs: these are resources which are squandered without bene…ting anyone. Note
that even if the costs l ¢Di(x) increase the utility of someone, they fall in this category: judges
are often assigned in an unpredictable way and, even if they are not, the state budget - not the
judge - is recipient of l ¢ Di(x); a large organization like the state is not easily susceptible to
a collusive suggestion. There could be other examples of sinks, for example if bene…ciaries are
randomly chosen ex post in a way that the agents cannot in‡uence (by a lottery, for example).
A transfer to a strategic player, on the other hand, is any payment made to a player who is ex
ante identi…able, like the charitable fund introduced earlier.
34This is true as long as the transferable amount does not exceed C(x; i) in state x. If more
can be transferred, then a better solution than the legal dispute solution is feasible by reducing
the size of S¤.
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6.3. Corruption
Corruption is the attempt to buy the favor of the judge (or jury) and thus alter ex
ante incentives through the manipulation of the trial outcome. Could our mech-
anism be undermined by this possibility? Corruption is distinct from collusion.
The side payments ‡ow in opposite directions in both cases: in a coalition, a
bene…ting third party bribes one of the agents to increase the probability of the
bad outcome. In corruption, one of the agents pays the judge. Also, coalitions
need to be formed before actions are taken. Corruption can be attempted before
or after the action (and in fact there is no advantage to bribing a judge ex ante).
We want to argue that there is no reason why our mechanism should be any
less e¤ective if the judge is corrupt compared to a situation where she is not. On
the contrary, corruption could even improve the allocation by adding to the net
litigation costs. To see this, assume that one of the agents has access to bribing the
judge. If this is bene…cial for the agent, the agent will do so. Ex ante, the bribery
is anticipated, and this will be built into the optimal contract: the agent who has
access to the judge has a higher expected probability to receive a “strong” signal,
or is more litigious. The other agent is more likely to receive a “weak” signal. The
aggregate e¤ect on the probability of litigation is ambiguous. However, the cost
of legal dispute have now increased by the amount of the bribe which makes it
likely that the net cost of litigation C(x) increases. A similar reasoning applies if
both agents are competing to bribe the judge: neither is necessarily more likely to
win the judge’s vote but both expect to spend on trying to gain the judges favor.
Net litigation costs have increased and the overall e¤ect is again ambiguous.
7. Conclusion
The main conclusion of our analysis is that the prospect of dispute can be inter-
preted as a deterrence device against lack of e¤ort or care. We identify condi-
tions where both parties are better o¤ with a contentious contract compared to a
litigation-proof contract. Even if parties are not fully aware of this side e¤ect of
unforeseen contingencies, this aspect could help to explain why incomplete con-
tracts are perhaps less costly than it might appear and why there is frequently
little e¤ort to eradicate incompleteness.
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In this paper, we propose a model of rational incompleteness of contracts,
based on the idea that legal dispute after unwanted outcomes could be employed
as an incentive device. Of course, this should not be misunderstood as an en-
compassing theory of incomplete contracts. There are several limitations to the
model. First, our model applies only to joint production. Even though aspects
of joint production are pervasive and certainly more important than is expressly
acknowledged in contracts, incompleteness is not limited to these cases. Sec-
ond, there are incompleteness phenomena which this model does not address,
for example omitted favorable contingencies (windfalls). Finally, our contribu-
tion should not be misunderstood as saying that bounded rationality is not an
important, and probably the most important, source of incompleteness. Many
incomplete contracts may exhibit both sources of incompleteness: on the one
hand, it is costly to foresee, to de…ne and to verify contingencies because agents
are boundedly rational. On the other hand, the true costs of incompleteness may
be lower because there is the aspect of rational deterrence which is highlighted in
the present paper. That would explain why so often even the attempt of sorting
out contingencies is lacking.
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8. Appendix A: The pretrial settlement bargaining game
This Appendix documents the pretrial settlement game which is adapted from Urs
Schweizer’s model (1989).35 While we document the details needed to understand
the selected equilibrium, we refer to the original for other interesting details.
In any contestable state x 2 S; each agent observes a signal which has two
possible outcomes, “strong” or “weak”. The signals are independently distrib-
uted. Recall that p(i) will denote the probability that the plainti¤ i observes the
good signal, etc. The plainti¤’s chances of winning a process in court is a function
of the pro…le of signals for both agents. Let d and p denote the defendant’s and
the plainti¤’s private information, respectively, and let ®dp denote the probability
that the case is won depending on the pair of signals of defendant and plainti¤,
with d; p 2 fg; bg: For example, ®bg is the probability that litigation is won by the
plainti¤ if she observes the “good” signal and the defendant observes the “bad”
signal. We have
®gb < ®bb < ®bg and ®gb < ®gg < ®bg:
Let
Gdp(x; i) = (®dp(1 + l) ¡ l) Di(x)
denote the expected gain of a plainti¤ of type p against a defendant type d . Then,
the plainti¤ i’s expected gain in court, if her type is p, is:
Gp(x; i) = (1 ¡ p(j))Gbp(x; i) + p(j)Ggp(x; i)
Let
Ldp(x; i) = ®dp(1 + l)Di(x)
denote the expected loss of defendant type d against a plainti¤ of type p. A
defendant j of type d has then an expected loss in court of
Ld(x; i) = (1 ¡ p(i))Ldb(x; i) + p(i)Ldg(x; i)
35The only signi…cant change with respect to Schweizer is that litigation costs are a function
of damages. Any of the numerous models of pretrial settlement bargaining under one-sided or
two-sided incomplete information, adapted to our model, would give analogous results, see for
example Bebchuk (1984), Png (1983) or Spier (1992). See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and
Kennan and Wilson (1993) for surveys.
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In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the “good” and the “bad” defendant
make distinct o¤ers. We describe next the least-cost separating equilibrium where
the o¤er of a “strong” defendant is sometimes rejected while the o¤er of a “weak”
defendant is always accepted. This is the outcome for a certain set of parameter
values; the bounds for this solution are documented below. The weak defendant
makes an o¤er of Gbg(x; i) which is accepted because no type of the plainti¤ i
could receive more. Therefore, the strong defendant must o¤er a settlement which
makes the weak plainti¤ indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting: this amount
is Ggb(x; i); as the plainti¤ infers (in the separating equilibrium) from the o¤er
that she is confronted to a strong defendant. Let q(i) denote the probability
of acceptance of a settlement o¤er proposed by the defendant if agent i is the
plainti¤.36 Note that only the weak plainti¤ mixes between accepting and reject-
ing the o¤er Ggb(x; i); the strong plainti¤ always rejects it. The key to establish
separation between the defendant’s types is that the weak defendant should have
no incentive to mimic her strong counterpart. If she were to imitate a strong
defendant, she would need to o¤er only Ggb(x; i) < Gbg(x; i): If she were always
rejected, she would expect to lose Lb(x; i). However, with probability q(i); her
o¤er of Ggb(x; i) is accepted; in this case, her marginal gain is Ggb(x; i)¡Lbb(x; i);
i.e. her o¤er minus her loss if being rejected (taking into account that she is actu-
ally the weak type.). In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the weak defendant
is just indi¤erent between both options, or
Lb(x; i) + q(i) [Ggb(x) ¡ Lbb(x)] = Gbg(x)
Thus, the acceptance probability of a settlement out of court is:
q(i) =




(1 + l)(1 ¡ p(i))(®bb ¡ ®bg) + l
(1 + l) (®bb ¡ ®gb) + l
By calculating out the expectation over the possible matches, the ex-ante
expected payo¤s can be determined as:
¦d(x; i) = [(1 ¡ p(j) + p(j) q(i))l ¡ (1 + l)©(i)] Di(x)
36Equation (8.1) demonstrates that q(i) is independent of x and Di(x).
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¦p(x; i) = ((1 + l)©(i) ¡ l)Di(x)
respectively, where ¦p(x; i) and ¦d(x; i)) denote the plainti¤’s and the defen-
dant’s expected pro…t, respectively, and where
©(i) = p(j)((1 ¡ p(i)®gb + p(i)®gg) + (1 ¡ p(j))®bg:
Note that both functions are linear in Di(x). For the total litigation cost, one
calculates:
C(x; i) = ¡¦d(x) ¡ ¦p(x) (8.2)
= p(j)(1 ¡ q(i)) l Di(x):
Note that if p(i) = p(j); then C(x; i) = C(x; j), i.e. the ex-ante expected
payo¤s of a dispute in state x 2 S are the same for both agents, and the expected
costs of litigation is independent of the choice of the defendant. More generally,
we have that
C(x; i) >< C(x; j) , p(i)
<
> p(j)
as a straightforward consequence of (8.2) and (8.1).
Finally, we document the parameter restrictions necessary for this outcome to




(®bg ¡ ®bb) · p(i) ·
1 + l(®bg ¡ ®gb)
l + (1 + l)(®bg ¡ ®gb)
: (8.3)
If p(i) is larger than the upper bound in (8.3), then the weak plainti¤ will
always accept the good o¤er while the strong plainti¤ will mix between accepting
and rejecting it. If p(i) is below the lower bound in (8.3), then a fully separating
equilibrium is not possible.
9. Appendix B: Proofs
9.1. Proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma (1) is proved by transforming the relaxed optimization problem into a
control problem. To this end, we de…ne control variables °1(x), °2(x) and °3(x)
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as follows. °1(x) (°1(x) 2 f0; 1g) indicates whether or not the state x is included
in S1; while °2(x) (°2(x) 2 f0; 1g) indicates if the state x is included in S2.
Finally, °3(x) indicates if the state x is contained in S1 \ S2. That is, S1 = fx 2
X : °1(x) = 1g, S2 = fx 2 X : °2(x) = 1g and S1 \ S2 = fx : °3(x) = 1g.Thus,
we write agent 1’s and agent 2’s ex-ante expected payo¤s from a dispute in the



























with the constraint that
°3(x) ¡ °1(x)°2(x) = 0; 8x: (9.1)
The ex-ante expected costs of litigation in state x, i.e. C(x), are given by
¡(R1(x) + R2(x)) = °1(x)C(x; 1) + °2(x)C(x; 2) ¡
°3(x)
2
(C(x; 1) + C(x; 2))
and the Lagrangian for the relaxed optimization problem is
L = E[xja1; a2] ¡
2X
i=1
c(ai)f (xja1; a2)dx ¡
Z
X




¯(x) f1(xja1; a2)dx +
Z
X





(1 ¡ ¯(x)) f2(xja1; a2)dx +
Z
X














f!(x)(°3(x) ¡ °1(x)°2(x))gdx (9.2)
To analyze this problem, we proceed in several steps.
Step 1. In this step, we show that Item 1 of Lemma 1 must be true for any
S1; S2;D1(x) and D2(x). This is shown from incentives constraints (3.1) - (3.2)

















= Ei[xja1; a2] ¡ ci(ai) ¡
Z
X




¯(x) f1i(xja1; a2)dx +
Z
X





(1 ¡ ¯(x)) f2i(xja1; a2)dx +
Z
X
R2(x)f2i(xja1; a2)dx ¡ c2i(a2)
¾
= 0
for i = 1; 2, with cji(:) = 0 for j 6= i: Note that equation (9.3) implies that
any solution must satisfy:
f1(xja1; a2)
f(xja1; a2)
(`1 ¡ k(a1; a2)`2) = 0 for all x 2 X (9.5)
since f2(xja1; a2) = k(a1; a2)f1(xja1; a2) under Assumption 1. Thus, we have
the following restriction on the equilibrium values of the multipliers for the
incentive-compatibility constraints:
Lemma 2. At any solution of the relaxed optimization problem, `1¡k(a1; a2)`2 =
0; with k(:)`2 > 0.
Proof. By de…nition, `i ¸ 0; i = 1; 2: Hence, condition (9.5) implies that one
of two situations can occur: either `1 = 0 and `2 = 0, or `1 ¡ k(:)`2 = 0 with
k(:)`2 > 0:
Suppose that `1 = 0 and `2 = 0 at the optimal solution. Then, equation (9.4)
reduces to for a2 :
@L
@a2
= E2[xja1; a2] ¡ c2(a1) ¡
Z
X
(R1(x) + R2(x)) f2(xja1; a2)dx = 0 (9.6)
Now, using the fact that
¡C(x) = R1(x) + R2(x); 8x






(C(x)+R1(x))f2(xja1; a2)dx ¸ 0: (9.7)








R1(x)f1(xja1; a2)dx ¸ 0 (9.8)
which contradicts incentive constraint (3.1).
Lemma (2) and Assumption 1 allow us to establish the existence of a linear
sharing rule (item 1 of Lemma 1). The proof is exactly analogous to the proof of
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine ((1995), Proposition 1) and is thus omitted.






2(x). Using the fact that
`1f1(xja1; a2) = `2f2(xja1; a2)
permits to write the …rst order conditions of the problem with respect to
































f(xja1; a2) + !(x)
= 0: (9.11)





























f(xja1; a2) ¡ ±2(x) + ½2(x)
= 0: (9.13)
Note that `1 > 0 and MLRP imply that 1 + `1
f1(xja1;a2)
f(xja1;a2) is increasing with x.






f(xja1; a2) < 0






f(xja1; a2) ¸ 0 for all x ¸ x¤. If 1 +
`1
f1(0ja1;a2)
f(0ja1;a2) ¸ 0, then x
¤ = 0 ; otherwise, x¤ solves 1 + `1
f1(xja1;a2)
f (xja1;a2) = 0. Note
also that @C(x;1)@D1(x) = lp(2)(1¡q(1)) and
@C(x;2)
@D2(x)
= lp(1)(1¡q(2)) are always positive.
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Hence, by complementary slackness, the …rst order conditions (9.12) and (9.13)
imply that D¤i (x) = D
max(x) for all x such that x < x¤, and D¤i (x) = 0 for all x
such that x > x¤.
Now, substituting equation (9.11) into (9.9) and (9.10) gives
³
°2(x)
















f(xja1; a2) ¡ Ã2(x) + Á2(x)
= 0 (9.15)
Recall that C(x; 1) = C(x; 2) = 0 for D1(x) = D2(x) = 0: Furthermore,
C(x; 1) > C(x; 2) when D1(x) = D2(x) > 0 if and only if p(1) < p(2) and
vice versa. Items 2 to 4 are therefore derived from conditions (9.14) and (9.15).
First, °1(x) = 0 and °2(x) = 0 for all x ¸ x¤ always solve these equations since
D¤1(x) = D
¤
2(x) = 0 for all x ¸ x¤:
Next, if p(1) < p(2) (the case where p(1) > p(2) is symmetric), by comple-
mentary slackness, these conditions imply that °1(x) = 1 and °2(x) = 0 for all
x < x¤ since C(x; 1) > C(x; 2) 8x < x¤ (recall that D¤1(x) = D¤2 = Dmax(x)).
Thus, S¤2 = ; while S¤1 = S¤ = fx : x < x¤g; with maximum applicable damages
(D¤1(x) = D
max(x), 8x 2 S¤1).
If p(1) = p(2), then C(x; 1) = C(x; 2) = Dmax(x)p(1)(1 ¡ q(2)) > 0 for all
x < x¤. Hence, conditions (9.14) and (9.15) imply that we must have either
°1(x) = 1 and °2(x) = 0, or °1(x) = 0 and °2(x) = 1; or °1(x) = °2(x) = 1,
for all x < x¤ : Thus, S¤ = fx : x < x¤g; and any choice of S1 and S2 solve the
problem.
Finally, to see that x¤ < x̂(a1; a2), remember that x̂(a1; a2) is the (unique)
value such that f1(xja1; a2) < 0 for x < x̂(a1; a2) and f1(xja1; a2) ¸ 0 otherwise.
Therefore, 1 + `1
f1(xja1;a2)
f(xja1;a2) > 0 at x = x̂(a1; a2).
Step 3. Now, we show that the optimal contract leads to an action pro…le
(a¤1; a
¤









¤ 6= ;. To this end, note that
`1 = k`2 > 0 implies that incentive constraints (4.2) and (4.3) are binding at any
solution. Thus, using Assumption 1 and adding up the two equations imply that





x f1(xja¤1; a¤2)dx ¡
Z x¤
C(x; 1)f1(xja¤1; a¤2)dx ¡ c1(a¤1) = c2(a¤2)=k(a¤1; a¤2)
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for p(1) · p(2), where C(x; 1) corresponds to C(x; 1) evaluated at Dmax(x).
Since -






xf1(xja¤1; a¤2)dx ¡ c1(a¤1) < c2(a¤2)=k(a¤1; a¤2):







Step 4. Finally, we check for the validity of the FOA. To do so, one must
verify that each agent’s e¤ort problem is strictly concave at K¤. In other words,
it is su¢cient to show that
V 111(K
¤; (a1; a¤2) < 0 (9.16)
for all a1 2 A1; and
V 222(K
¤; (a¤1; a2) < 0 (9.17)
for all a2 2 A2. In fact, these conditions are always satis…ed for S¤1 = S¤2 =
S¤ under the Mirrlees-Rogerson convexity of the distribution function condition
(CDFC). Without loss of generality, assume that S¤1 = ; and S¤2 = S¤, i.e. agent
1 is the defendant. We have:
V 1(K¤; (a1; a2)) =
Z
X




Integrating (9.18) by parts and di¤erentiating twice gives
V 111(K
¤; (a1; a¤2) = ¡¯¤
Z
X
F11(xja1; a¤2)dx + ¦d(x; 2)F11(x¤ja1; a¤2)
¡
Z x¤ @¦d(x; 2)
@x
F11(xja1; a¤2)dx ¡ c11(a1)




¤; (a1; a¤2) is strictly negative if F11(xj:) ¸ 0 which is the Mirrlees-Rogerson
condition (CDFC).
For agent 2, we have








Integrating by parts this expression and di¤erentiating twice gives:
V 222(K
¤; (a¤1; a2) = ¡(1 ¡ ¯¤)
R
X F22(xja¤1; a2)dx + ¦p(x¤; 2)F22(x¤ja¤1; a2)
¡ R x¤ @¦p(x;2)@x F22(xja¤1; a2)dx ¡ c22(a2)
Note that ¦p(x; 2) ¸ 0 for all x, and @¦p(x;2)@x · 0 for
@Dmax(x)
@x · 0. Therefore,
in order to show that expression (9.17) is usually negative under CDFC, we must
be more speci…c here about the legal bound on damages, Dmax(x). Let assume,
for example, that punitive damages are denied in court. Then, the maximum
applicable damages will cover the monetary loss of the plainti¤ and (eventually)
his legal expenses. We set Dmax(x) = ¾(x¤ ¡ x) . It implies that
V 222(K






F22(xja¤1; a2)dx ¡ c22(a2)
since ¦p(x¤; 2) = 0: The last expression is strictly negative for a wide range
of values for ¾. Note that incentives constraints (4.2) and (4.3) require that





) at any solution37. Thus, if ¾ < 12 (1¡
c1(a)¡kc2(0)
E1(xja;a) )
for example; then ((1 ¡ ¯¤) + ¾ (l ¡ (1 + l)©(2))) is positive for all implementable
(a1; a2) and V 222(K
¤; (a¤1; a2) < 0.
Proof of Corollary 1.
Assume to the contrary that S¤ = ; under condition (4.6). Then, incentives
constraints (4.2) and (4.3) imply that (ac1; a
c
2) is the optimal action pro…le. Now,
consider the …rst order conditions of problem (9.2). The FOC with respect to a1,
condition (9.3), reduces to
@L
@a1
= E1[xjac1; ac2] ¡ c1(ac1) + `1
½Z
x
x f11(xjac1; ac2)dx ¡ c11(ac1)
¾
= 0 (9.20)
since `1 = k`2 at any solution, which gives
`1 = ¡
E1[xjac1; ac2] ¡ c1(ac1)R
x xf11(xjac1; ac2)dx ¡ c11(ac1)
:
37To see that, substract equations (4.3) to (4.2).
33





Proof of Proposition 1.
To establish equivalence between K¤ and the contract of Proposition 1, we
need to show that the optimal contract does not need to specify (Di(x); ¯(x)) for
all x < x¤.
First, concerning Di(x), recall that K¤ always picks Di(x) = Dmax(x): By
assumption, Dmax(x) is awarded if damages are not speci…ed in the contract. It
follows that not specifying Di(x) for x < x¤ is equivalent to K¤.
Second, concerning ¯(x), recall that if ¯(x) is not speci…ed for some x < x¤
then it will be chosen by the court. We show the following claim: if the condition
in Proposition 1 holds, then C(x; i) is the same for contract K¤ and an optimal
contract which does not specify (Di(x); ¯(x)).
Let the plainti¤’s payo¤ be w(x) if she wins and ¸(x) if she loses. By bal-
ancedness, we have that the defendant receives x¡w(x) if she loses and x ¡¸(x)
if she wins. Note that w(x)¡¸(x) is the amount of what is at stake in a dispute.
By de…nition of maximum damages, it must be the case that:
w(x) ¡ ¸(x) · Dmax(x)
Moreover, if Di(x) is not speci…ed for some x, then Dmax(x) will be awarded,
hence
w(x) ¡ ¸(x) = Dmax(x)
for all x 2 fx jDi(x) is not speci…ed for x:g. Also, recall that Dmax(x) will
be attributed under K¤: Thus, the contentious amount is the same in both
cases, viz. Dmax(x): Recall that then litigation costs lDmax(x) are also identical.
With these results, it is easy to verify that q(i) must be as de…ned in equation
(8.1) and C(x; i) = p(j)(1 ¡ q(i))Dmax(x) must be the same in both cases. Fi-
nally, from Lemma 1, it follows that the allocation (a¤1; a
¤
2) is fully explained by
maxiC(x; i):
Proof of Proposition 2.
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To prove this claim, note that:
@ ¦p(x; i)
@ pI(ai)



















= [®bg ¡ ®gb]Di(x)(1 + l) ¡ (1 ¡ qI(ai))lDi(x)














= [®bg ¡ ®gb]Di(x)(1 + l) ¡ (1 ¡ qI(ai))lDi(x)
Thus, to show that this expression is positive, we have to show that
[®bg ¡ ®gb] (1 + l) > (1 ¡ qI(ai))l:
After substituting for qI(ai):
[®bg ¡ ®gb] (1 + l) >
"
1 ¡ (1 + l)(1 ¡ p
I(ai))(®bb ¡ ®bg) + l
(1 + l)(®bb ¡ ®gb) + l
#
l
which is always true. This …nishes the …rst step.
Step 2. Let V I i(K; (a1; a2)) denote agent i’s expected utility in the infor-
mative case. Let P i(xjaI1; aI2) denote i’s payo¤ in a contestable state (in analogy
to Ri(xja1; a2) in the model of Section 2.) To check for (1) in Proposition 2, con-
sider the …rst-order conditions with respect to a1 and a2 which hold with equality
for any optimal contract. If signals are correlated, then this condition takes the
following form for agent 1:

















f(xjaI1; aI2)dx = 0
(9.21)
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and analogously for agent 2. Adding up the two …rst-order equations (9.21)
and using the fact that f1(xja; a) = f2(xja; a) under the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 2, we get for a symmetric action pro…le (aI ; aI):
R




P 1(xjaI ; aI) + P 2(xjaI ; aI)
´















f(xjaI ; aI)dx = 0
(9.22)
Note that (9.22) is a necessary condition for the implementation of the action
pro…le (aI ; aI). Of course, this expression depends on the properties of the optimal
solution of the contracting problem in the informative case. In fact, one can show
that, if the quali…cation in Proposition 2 holds and the allocation is symmetric,
then the optimal set of dispute states satis…es SI = [0; xI); xI < x̂(aI ; aI); with
SI1 = S
I
2 : Note also that the optimal Di(x) = D
max(x); as in the basic model.
Therefore, we can rewrite equation (9.22) as follows:
R
x xf1(xjaI ; aI)dx +





















= 0 when a1 = a2 8a. The …rst three terms
on the RHS of (9.23) are the same as in the benchmark model (with uncorrelated
signals) for (aI ; aI) = (a¤; a¤) and pI(a¤1) = p(1) and p
I(a¤2) = p(2), respectively.
Furthermore, we have shown that the last one is always positive. Hence,
xI < x¤ at (aI ; aI) = (a¤; a¤): (9.24)
Finally, Item 2 in the Proposition is an immediate consequence of (9.24).
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